marktigere1
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 04:38 PM |
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Cateringvan litigations
Spent a while pondering this but wondered if anyone had the legal angle on it.
Why have Cateringvan sued all the seven replica firms (Tiger, Robin Hood, Westfield etc etc) on a design that is over 25 years old?
If you look at the Lamborgini Countach, Diablo etc they have had replicas built with no sign of litigation. One of the latest Diablo replica's
is aparently the same dimensions as the original but is still in production. (Was featured in a kit car magazine a few months ago but I've
forgotten the name).
Is it due to the fact that the chasis of the Lambo replica's are different?
This also applies to the Cobra replica's.
Or am I missing something obvious?
Please help, its keeping me awake at night
Cheers
Mark
If a bolt is stuck force it.
If it breaks, it needed replacing anyway!!!
(My Dad 1991)
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Tiger Super Six
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 05:00 PM |
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Are they sueing them? how can they after all this time??
Mark
Tiger Avon
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marktigere1
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 05:04 PM |
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Sorry for the confusion.
As far as I know they are not suing anyone at the moment. I'm referring to the past 10 years or so they have been very active in the law
courts.
I have no problem with this but cannot understand why Lamborghini are happy for companies to produce replica's that look identical. Same with
Ferrari for that matter. Neither of which have sued anyone.......yet!!!!!
Just interested thats all.
[Edited on 2/12/05 by marktigere1]
If a bolt is stuck force it.
If it breaks, it needed replacing anyway!!!
(My Dad 1991)
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Tiger Super Six
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 05:07 PM |
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Probably because all the others make cars that are just as much fun for about £10k less!!!
Mark
Tiger Avon
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flak monkey
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 05:12 PM |
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I should magine that the companies making Ferrari and Lambo replicas have been in trouble at various times, or maybe the Italians just cant be arsed
to chase them!
Even if the design is more than 25yrs old Caterham can sue people who copy them if they have kept the patents etc on the design, though most companies
give up renewing them after a few years.
I think Caterham probably feel they have lost a lot of money to people building 7's that arent Caterhams.
They have even got an issue with people using the number 7 in relation to a seven style car...! A few of the Locost companies have been in trouble for
that one.
David
Sera
http://www.motosera.com
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MikeR
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 05:32 PM |
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ferrari does sue - i believe the replica's have got round this some how but you see signs at shows saying "we do not condone or encourage
the placing of ferrari badges on our cars".
Can't help thinking that they have to say that for a reason.
Caterham are just trying to protect there brand - they are a small player in a large specialist car market. They are therefore very agressive.
I believe there was an altercation with BMW and the 7 series. In the end they agreed to settle - sueing someone is 90% abuot how big your pockets are,
perhaps BMW had bigger pockets.
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Mark Allanson
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 05:41 PM |
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As far as I know, the automotive copyright expires 15 years after the cessation of production of the particular model.
Best example was the Covin 911 in the eighties, I think they had a shot fired across their bows and redesigned the front
If you can keep you head, whilst all others around you are losing theirs, you are not fully aware of the situation
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mangogrooveworkshop
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 05:59 PM |
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If you are interested in all of that stuff this was one of the last big ones.
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No. 393/95
In the matter between:
CATERHAM CAR SALES & COACHWORKS LIMITED Appellant
and
BIRKIN-CARS (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED First Respondent
JOHN BIRKIN WATSON Second Respondent
Coram: SMALBERGER, HARMS, MARMS, SCHUTZ and PLEWMAN JJA
Heard: 11 MAY 1998
Delivered: 27 MAY 1998
JUDGMENT
HARMSJA/
HARMS JA:
[1] This is a passing-off case and concerns the exclusive right to
manufacture, and sell reproductions of the Lotus Seven Series III
sports car. The appellant (the plaintiff, "Caterham" claims exclusivity for
its product, the Caterham Seven or Super Seven, and alleges that the Birkin
Seven, the product of the first respondent (the first defendant, "Birkin" is
being passed off as that of Caterham's. Both these sports cars are replicas
of this particular Lotus model, a car with a classic and distinctive shape and
appearance. (I use the term "replica" to mean a copy or reproduction made
by someone other than the original designer). Even an expert finds it
difficult to distinguish between these three cars from a relatively short
distance.
[2] The essence of Caterham's contention on appeal is that the use
of the numeral Seven has become distinctive of a sports car having the
particular shape and external configuration of the Lotus Seven Series Ill and
that the use of a Seven in relation to a sports car having this shape and
configuration serves to identify the car as emanating from Caterham or its
predecessor. Caterham, at the hearing of the appeal, abandoned any claim
for damages and limited the relief sought to an interdict restraining the
respondents from manufacturing, marketing, selling and exporting from
South Africa a sports car having the said shape and configuration which
uses upon or in relation thereto the -numeral Seven in either alphabetic or
numeric form. There are no registered trade marks, designs or patents that
have a bearing on Caterham's rights It is no longer argued that Birkin was
guilty of the general delict of unfair competition as set out in Schultz v Butt
1986 (3) SA 667 (A). More importantly, the application of the principles
concerning passing-off in relation to a get-up shorn of a distinctive name
do not form part of Caterham's case on appeal (cf Weber-Stephen Products
Co v Alrite Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 1992 (2) SA 489 (A); Reckiti
& Colman Products Limited v Borden Inc and Others [1990] RPC 341
(EL)). The reasons will become apparent. Initially Caterham's main claims
related to copyright infringement. Ml the original claims were dismissed
by the trial judge, Howard JP, in the Durban and Coast Local Division. He
refused leave to appeal on copyright but granted leave on passing-off.
[3] For the background facts I rely heavily upon the judgment of
Howard JP, and what follows is in part a quotation from it. The Lotus
Seven sports car was designed by the late Colin Chapman and developed,
manufactured, marketed and sold from about 1957 to 1972 by one or more
companies in the Lotus group which Chapman founded. Nothing turns on
the structure of the Lotus group and I shall refer to these companies singly
and collectively as "Lotus". The Lotus Seven was designed as a relatively
cheap sports car which would appeal to motor racing enthusiasts. Four
models were designed and built consecutively and they were identified as
the Series 1(1957), Series 11(1960), Series 111(1968) and Series IV (1970)
respectively. There is a suggestion that Chapman did not have a hand in
the design of the last model and that it was marketed somewhat against his
will, but that is of no consequence. Of importance to this case is the Series
III.
[4] Caterham is a company incorporated and registered in
England and it carries on business as a motor dealer and manufacturer of
sports cars at Caterham in Surrey. It became a distributor of Lotus cars in
1959 and the sole distributor of Lotus-Seven sports cars in the United
Kingdom from about 1965. Lotus ceased manufacturing any car in the
Seven series in 1972, by which stage the version then in production was the
IV. In terms of a written agreement dated 28 February 1973 the plaintiff
purchased from Lotus, inter alia,
The exclusive right to manufacture, sell and distribute Lotus
Seven Series IV cars (and subsequent series thereof) in the
United Kingdom and certain European countries;
(ii) The right to manufacture, sell and distribute spare parts for
Lotus cars of whatever series and the exclusive right to
describe itself as 'Lotus Seven Spares Distributor', and
(iii)The right to use the Lotus symbol in connection with the
manufacture, sale and distribution of spare parts but not
otherwise.
(My underlining.)
[5] Pursuant to this agreement Caterham manufactured and sold
about 30 Series IV cars. Thereafter it began manufacturing the earlier
Series III, using jigs, tools and drawings which it had received from Lotus,
presumably for the purpose of manufacturing spare parts for that model.
Lotus acquiesced in the manufacture and sale of the Series III cars and
accepted payment of royalties in respect of them as though they had been
manufactured pursuant to the agreement. Since then Caterham has
continued to manufacture the Series III, with modifications and
improvements from time to time, and to market and sell it as the Caterham
Super Seven car. (The evidence is not always consistent and reference is
also made to the car as a Caterham Seven.) Subsequently, during the period
1985 to 1988, Lotus and Caterham entered into a number of agreements in
which copyright and, more importantly for purposes of this case, the alleged
rights to goodwill and to the unregistered trade marks Seven, Super Seven
and Super 7 were assigned to Caterham. There was an initial assignment
during 1983 relating to the UK and Europe, but it was superseded in 1988
by an assignment of all the rights to and in these trade marks together with
the goodwill in the business of manufacturing and selling Lotus Seven cars
in all countries in the world excepting North America.
[6] Birkin is a local company which carries on business as a
manufacturer of sports cars at Pinetown. Its replica of the Lotus Seven
Series III is marketed and sold in South Africa under the name of Birkin
Seven or Super Seven and is also exported to Japan. Watson (the second
respondent/defendant) is the managing director of Birkin. Howard JP
found no reason to disbelieve his evidence as to how he designed and
developed the Birkin model. He is a mechanical engineer with
considerable experience in building and working on sports cars. From
about 1981 when he moved to Durban and started an engineering business
he became acquainted with a syndicate of people who were engaged in
building replicas of the Series III. He purchased a chassis from a member
and built a replica for himself. He also made parts for other members of
the syndicate and by the end of 1982 he had recognised a commercial
opportunity.
[7] Watson knew that Lotus was no longer making the Series III
and that Caterham was manufacturing a replica. During January 1983 he
proposed to Caterham's managing director, Mr Nearn, that Birkin be
licensed to manufacture and distribute Caterham Super Seven cars in
South Africa. The terms upon which the plaintiff was prepared to do business
with Birkin were unacceptable to Watson and the proposal was dropped.
Watson thereafter approached Status Cars (Pty) Ltd in Pietermaritzburg,
the local distributor and service agent for Lotus. This culminated in an
agreement of 20 January 1983 in which Status Cars recorded that Lotus
had accepted in principle a proposal that Birkin would manufacture a replica
of the Lotus Seven Series III under licence to Lotus but not bearing the
Lotus name, that the vehicle would be marketed through Status Cars and
that it would be named the Classic Super Seven. Watson went ahead with
the venture believing that he had the approval of Lotus.
[8] Birkin produced a prototype for a launch in Pietermaritzburg
on 12 October 1983. Present were Chapman's widow, Mrs Hazel Chapman,
Peter Waugh, the manager of Team Lotus International Ltd, Nigel Mansell
and Elio de Angelis, the Team Lotus Formula 1 drivers, and Mike Bishop
who was the export sales manager for Lotus. Team Lotus International Ltd
was involved in Formula 1 motor racing and was not a member of the Lotus
group. Mrs Chapman unveiled the prototype and the launch received wide
press publicity. Birkin produced these cars for Status Cars in accordance
with their arrangement. Twelve were produced during the period from 15
December 1983 to 14 January 1983. Thereafter a written contract was
concluded in terms of which Birkin granted to Lotus Motors (Pty) Ltd, the
successor of Status Cars as local agent of Lotus, the exclusive right to sell
world-wide all Classic Super Seven vehicles manufactured by Birkin. The
venture was not a success and was terminated in August 1983.
[9] At about the same time Watson reopened negotiations with
Nearn for a licence. These foundered, with Nearn threatening legal action
for infringement of copyright, knowing full well that he had no such rights.
Birkin did not have the financial resources to continue with the production
of complete cars and so reverted to manufacturing replacement and
conversion parts for existing cars and to supplying kits comprising chassis,
suspension parts and other components which enthusiasts could not obtain
elsewhere. With an, injection of funds Birkin was eventually able to
resume the full time manufacture of complete cars marketed as Birkin
Sevens or Super Sevens.
[10] I now turn to consider the issues as they emerged during oral
argument. The heads of argument of Caterham tended to conceal counsel's
intentions and may largely be discounted.
[11] Howard JP, after referring to some authorities, English and
local, accepted as correct a statement by Webster & Page South African
Law of Trade Marks 3rd ed p 420 to the effect that since the ordinary rules
relating to jurisdiction apply to an action for passing-off, it is essential for
the plaintiff to prove that the goodwill he seeks to protect extends to the
area of jurisdiction of the court in which he sues. That, he held, meant
that Caterham had to prove the existence of goodwill "generated by sales"
within the area of jurisdiction of the court below. A similar statement of
the law is to be found in Star Industrial Company Limited v Yap Kwee Kor
(trading as New Star Industrial Company) [1976] FSR 256 (PC) 269:
" A passing-off action is a remedy for the invasion of a right of
property not in the mark, name or get-up improperly used, but in the
business or goodwill likely to be injured by the misrepresentation
made by passing-off one persons goods as the goods of another.
Goodwill, as the subject of proprietary rights, is incapable of
subsisting by itself. It has no independent existence apart from the
business to which it is attached. It is local in character and
divisible; if the business is carried on in several countries a separate goodwill
attaches to it in each."
The proposition fits in with the first essential of a passing-off action as
formulated by Lord Fraser in Erven Warnink B V and Another v J Townend
& Sons (Hull) Ltd and Another [1979] AC 731 at 755, namely that the
business of the plaintiff must consist of or include "selling in England a
class of goods to which the particular trade name applies."
(12) Caterham’s case as formulated in the court below was along
These lines: Lotus carried on business in South Africa ; Lotus had a goodwill
and reputation in the Lotus Seven Series I to IV; the goodwill and reputation
Became that of Caterham during 1988 by virtue of the assignment from
Lotus; since 1988 Birkin made a number of misrepresentations relating to
its car's provenance and that amounted to a passing-off. The problem is
that, if one applies the law as just stated, Caterham was doomed to fail.
Lotus stopped making the III before 1973, either in South Africa or
elsewhere. There is also no indication that it had any business of any sort
in South Africa by 1988. There was thus no residual goodwill which could
have been assigned in 1988. Following a similar factual route, Howard JP
dismissed the claim.
[13] It is necessary to pause and consider whether the statement in
Webster & Page does not conflate two different matters, namely the
elements of the delict of passing-off and the requirements for jurisdiction.
The court below had jurisdiction, I would suggest, because the defendants
reside within its area. Had they not been residents of that court, the
question would have been whether the claim in delict had arisen within its
jurisdiction (cf Thomas v BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1996 (2) SA 106(C)
127G-H). The unrelated, but for this case germane, question concerns the
elements of the wrong. They are the "classical trinity" of reputation (or
goodwill), misrepresentation and damage (Consorzio del Prosciutto di
Parma v Marks & Spencer PLC and Others [1991] RPC 331 (CA) 368 line
34 - 369 line 51).
[14] Our courts of first instance have so far adopted the same
approach as that of the court below (Slenderella Systems incorporated of
America v Hawkins and Another 1959 (1) SA 519 (W) 521A-522B;
Lorimar Productions Inc and Others v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers
(Pty) Ltd 1981(3) SA 1129 (T) ll38H-ll4OA; Tie Rack plc v Tie Rack -
Stores (Pty) Ltd and Another 1989 (4) SA 427 (T) 442G-445D). These
judgments are the reason for the characterisation of South Africa, with the
UK, as the only major "hard line" jurisdictions left (Wadlow The Law of
Passing-off 2nd ed p 98). The matter was recently debated in this Court, but
the question was left open (McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn
Restaurant (Pty) Ltd and Another 1997 (1) SA 1(A) 15-19). It was pointed
out (at l6A-D) that the origin of the "hard line" is to be found in an oft-
quoted dictum of Lord Macnaghten in The Commissioners of inland
Revenue v Muller & Go 's Margarine Limited [1901] AC 217 (HL). Before
I consider that case, it is convenient first to focus on the general principles
of passing-off.
[15] The essence of an action for passing-off is to protect a
business against a misrepresentation of a particular kind, namely that the
business, goods or services of the representor is that of the plaintiff or is
associated therewith (Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd and
Others v Holiday Inns Inc and Others 1977(2) SA 916(A) 929C-D). In
other words, it protects against deception as to a trade source or to a
business connection (Reckitt & Colman 51 (Pty) Ltd v 5 C Johnson & Son
SA (Pty) Ltd 1993(2) SA 307 (A) 3153). Misrepresentations of this kind
can be committed only in relation to a business that has goodwill or a
drawing power (Afrikaans: "werfkrag". Goodwill is the totality of
attributes that lure or entice clients or potential clients to support a particular
business (cf A Becker and Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker and Others 1981
(3) SA 406 (A) 417A). The components of goodwill are many and diverse
(O’Kennedv v Smit 1948 (2) SA 63 (C) 66; Jacobs v Minister of Agriculture
1972 (4) SA 608 (W) 624A - 62SF). Well recognised are the locality and
the personality of the driving force behind the business (ibid), business
licences (Receiver of Revenue, Cape v Cavanagh, 1912 AD 459),
agreements such as restraints of trade (Botha and Another v Carapax
Shadeports (Pty) Ltd 1992 (I) SA 202 (A) 211K-I) and reputation. These
components are not necessarily all present in the goodwill of any particular
business.
[16] The only component of goodwill of a business that can be
damaged by means of a passing-off is its reputation and it is for this reason
that the first requirement for a successful passing-off action is proof of the
relevant reputation (Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd v The Beauty Box
(Dr) Ltd (in liquidation) and Another 1987(2) SA 600 (A) 613F-G; Brian
Boswell Circus (Pr) Ltd and Another v Boswell- Wilkie Circus (Pr) Ltd
1985 (4) SA 466 (A) 479D; Williams t/a Jenifer Williams & Associates and
Another v Life-Line Southern Transvaal 1996 (3) SA 408 (A) 419A-fl,
420B.) Misrepresentations concerning other components of goodwill are
protected by other causes of action such as claims for injurious falsehoods.
It is thus incorrect to equate goodwill With reputation (or vice versa) or to
suggest that the "need for some reputation or secondary meaning to be
shown... is not a principle or rule of law" (Union Wine Ltd v E Snell & Co
Ltd 1990 (2) SA 180(D) 1831-J). If the protection of the reputation of a
business is the only or main concern of the remedy, why is it necessary to
localise goodwill for purposes of passing-off? A similar question has been
posed more than once (cf Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition
(1995) p 178-183 and NS Page in (1990)2 SA Merc LJ 29). The answer
must be sought in The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Muller & Co's
Margarine Ltd, a case which the Federal Court of Australia (General
Division) in ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd 23 IPR 193,
[1992] 106 ALR 465 encourages one to read 5 a whole and in context and
not to rely on the famous dictum of Lord Macnaghten in isolation. - -
[17] The issue was whether a particular agreement was subject to
payment of stamp duty -under the Stamp Act 1891. The Act imposed stamp
duty upon any agreement made in the UK except for the sale of "any
property locally situate out of the United Kingdom." Simplified the facts
were these. One Muller had carried on a wholesale business as
manufacturer of a margarine in a town in Germany. He sold, inter alia, the
goodwill of the business together with a covenant that he would not be
engaged in a similar trade within fifty miles of that town. The main issue
was whether the goodwill of the business fell thin the statutory exception,
the Commissioners arguing that it did not because goodwill is incorporeal
and cannot be situate anywhere. The question was "whether the goodwill
which is comprised in this contract has a locality for the purpose of the
Stamp Act" (Lord Davey at 226). Lord Macnaghten posed the same
question and proceeded to answer it (at 223 - 225) and 1 quote his speech
on the subject fully with underlining added:
"Then comes the question, Can it be said that goodwill has a local
situation within the meaning of the Act? I am disposed to agree with
an observation thrown out in the course of the argument, that it is not
easy to form a conception of property having no local situation.
What is goodwill? It is a thing very easy to describe, very difficult
to define. It is the benefit and advantage of the good name,
reputation, and connection of a business. It is the attractive force
which brings in custom. It is the one thing which distinguishes an
old-established business from a new business at its first start. The
goodwill of a business must emanate from a particular centre or
source. However widely extended or diffused its influence may be,
goodwill is worth noting unless it has power of attraction sufficient
to bring customers home to the source from which it emanates.
Goodwill is composed of a variety of elements. It differs in its
composition in different trades and in different businesses in the
same trade. One element may preponderate here and another
element there. To analyse goodwill and split it up into its
component parts, to pare it down as the Commissioners desire to do
until nothing is left but a dry residuum ingrained in the actual place
where the business is carried on while everything else is in the air,
seems to me to be as useful for practical purposes as it would be to
resolve the human body into the various substances of which it is
said to be composed. The goodwill of a business is one whole, and
in a case like this it must be dealt with as such.
For my part, I think that if there is one attribute common to all cases
of goodwill it is the attribute of locality. For goodwill has no
independent existence. It cannot subsist by itself. It must be
attached to a business. Destroy the business, and the goodwill
perishes with it, though elements remain which may perhaps be
gathered up and be revived again. No doubt where the reputation
of a business is very widely spread or where it is the article produced
rather that the producer of the article that has won popular favour.
it maybe difficult to localise goodwill. But here. I think. there is no
difficulty. We have it in evidence that the firm of Muller & Co. had
no customers out of Germany, and it is a significant fact that the
protected area - the limit within which the vendor is prohibited from
setting up in business - is the limit of fifty miles from Gildehaus.
Moreover, under the Stamp Act of 1891 we are not required to
define the local situation of the goodwill. We have only to
determine whether it is or is not situate out of the United Kingdom.
Surely, if there were an agreement made in England for the sale of
a local German newspaper, the circulation of which did not extend
beyond a limited district in Germany, no one would doubt that the
goodwill of that business was locally situate out of the United
Kingdom; and so it must be, I think, in the present case."
[18] The conclusion arrived at was an inevitable consequence of
the question posed. As the underlined passages illustrate, the answer was
neither directed at passing-off nor intended to give an all-embracing
definition or analysis of the concept of "goodwill" irrespective of the
context in which it appears. The fact that, under certain circumstances, the
locality of a business night be a component of goodwill, does not mean that
goodwill can only exist where the business is located. This Lord
Macnaghten appreciated. One wonders what the drawing power of the
place of business is if the business is conducted solely by post or over the
Internet. There is therefore merit in the view of Lockhart J, namely that the
law of passing-off should not be trammelled by definitions of goodwill
developed in the field of revenue laws (ConAgra Inc at 232 in IPR).
[19] My earlier conclusion that reputation is pivotal to passing-off
is fortified by Lockhart J's findings - in an encyclopaedic dissertation - that
"reputation is the key business facet that passing off protects" and that "the
requirement of 'goodwill' was not meant to have [in this context] a different
meaning from reputation and [that] its inclusion only serves to complicate
the matter" (at 231 in fine). The decisions of our courts to the opposite
effect can no longer be considered to be good law. They are based upon a
misunderstanding of Lord Macnaghten's dictum, they are inconsistent with
general principles and incompatible with the world we live in and modern
foreign jurisprudential trends. I would in any event venture to suggest that
most of those cases, if not all, would have had the same result had the
correct question been asked. A case such as Victoria's Secret Inc v Edgars
Stores Ltd 1994 (3) SA 739 (A) is not in conflict with what I have stated
simply because it was concerned with the interpretation of the repealed
Trade Marks Act 62 of 1963 and not with passing-off.
[20] The correct question can be distilled from the judgments on
passing-off of this Court mentioned earlier in pars [13] and [16] and from
ConAgra Inc (esp at 234, 237 and 269). In general terms, it appears to me
to be whether the plaintiff has, in a practical and business sense, a sufficient
reputation amongst a substantial number of persons who are either clients
or potential clients of his business. As far as the "location" of reputation is
concerned, it must subsist where the misrepresentation complained of
causes actual or potential damage to the drawing power of the plaintiffs
business. Otherwise the misrepresentation would be made in the air and be
without any consequences. The locality of the plaintiffs business is not
hereby rendered irrelevant. Obviously, it must be an important
consideration in determining whether the plaintiff has potential clients and
whether the alleged misrepresentation causes his business any harm.
Likewise, the extent of a business's reputation and the scope of its activities
are relevant to the probability of deception and to damages - the smaller the
reputation, the smaller the likelihood of deception and of damage, and vice
versa.
[21] The nature of the reputation that a plaintiff has to establish
was well stated by Lord Oliver in a judgment referred to at the outset of this
judgment, namely Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc and Others
[1990] RPC 341 (HL) 406 lines 26 - 31:
"First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the
goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing
public by association with the identifying 'get-up' (whether it
consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the
individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his
particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the
get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the
plaintiffs goods or services."
(My underlining. See also Lord Jauncey at 417 I 3 - 6.) The words
underlined are pertinent and echo those of Nicholas J that -
"the plaintiff must prove that the feature of his product on which he
relies has acquired a meaning or significance, so that it indicates a
single source for goods on which that feature is used."
(Adcock-Ingram Products Ltd v Beecham 51 (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 434 (W)
437A-B). Put differently, reputation is dependent upon distinctiveness (cf
Van Heerden & Neethling p169).
[22] The reputation relied upon must have been in existence at the
time the defendant entered the market, in other words, a plaintiff cannot rely
upon a reputation that oveftook the business of the defendant (Anheuser
Busch Inc v Budetovicicy Buavar NP (trading as Buttveiser Buavar
Brewery) and Others [1984] FSR 413 (CA) 462). It must also exist when
the misrepresentation is committed.
[23] There is a small group of people who are passionate about old
and inconvenient cars and who are prepared to buy a replica of a car
designed in 1968 in which the designer himself had lost interest in 1970.
why the interest in the III? According to the witnesses, it all revolves
around the classic shape of a relatively cheap car. It is inexpensive because
Lotus designed not much more than the chassis and body, relying on
standard moving parts, such as a Ford engine and a Triumph gearbox. The
design is ideal for use as a kit car and relatively easy to reproduce. It is
considered to be special because Colin Chapman designed it - "it had a
pedigree from Colin Chapman" said one of the witnesses. Chapman is
famous because he designed a British car (not the Seven) which was able
to compete successfully in Grand Prix races against German and Italian
competition. Here was an attractive sports car with a pedigree which could
be used on the road or on a track within the reach of the less affluent
enthusiast.
[24] There has always been a potential, but small, local market for
such a product among cognoscenti and it is only fair to assume that they
knew the following facts. Lotus made four cars of different shapes, each
having Seven as part of its name. In 1972 it stopped production of the last
car in the series, namely the IV. Under licence Caterham took over the
manufacture of IV's. Some time later it began to manufacture the III. It
was available for export to South Africa. Lotus never produced another
Seven. A number of replicas were being produced locally and around the
world, including those by Birkin since 1983. Many were privately built.
As early as 1984 the manufacture of replicas, in the words of Nearn of
Caterham, had almost become a national pastime in South Africa. Lotus had
a business presence in South Africa by virtue of its agency agreement (what
it entailed we do not know) with Status Cars and the local Lotus Motors,
and they distributed Birkin's replica. Caterham had hardly any market
presence in South Africa. (In fact, only four cars were exported to South
Africa during the early 1980's and none since.) Lotus badges are affixed
to replicas by the owners as a matter of course. Local Lotus enthusiasts
formed a club called The Lotus Register. Its object is to promote an interest
in "Lotus" cars, not only those manufactured by Lotus but also "acceptable
replicas". They keep a record of these cars and know of 71 Series III cars
in South Africa: two are genuine Lotus's, there is one Caterham, there are
41 Birkins and the rest home-built.
[25] These facts are fatal to Caterham's now abandoned claim
based upon the distinctiveness of the shape and configuration of the III.
Lotus had lost interest in the Seven. It knew all along that replicas were
being built around the world, but provided the name Lotus was not
appropriated, it had no objection. It knew of the Birkin since its launch in
1983 and, in the words of its secretary, acquiesced in its production and
refrained from taking any action. Through the inaction of Lotus, which sat
by while others copied its onetime car, the distinctiveness of the car was
first diluted and then destroyed. The shape of the III no longer gave any
indication of its provenance.
[26] The appellant argued, however, that the use of the name
Seven, which it was said is a common law trade mark, made all the
difference. The reasoning was more or less this. Lotus was, because of
use, the original owner of the reputation in a car with the shape of the Ill
and carrying the name Seven. Lotus licensed Caterham to manufacture the
III and to use the trade mark Seven. Caterham utilised its rights under the
licence agreement. During the years 1973 to 1988 it proceeded to build on
Lotus's reputation and to expand it. Because it acted as licensee everything
Caterham did enured to the benefit of Lotus. During 1988 Lotus assigned
its goodwill to Caterham. and the goodwill and reputation in the shape plus
trade mark thereafter vested in Caterham. A Lotus replica with the name
Seven used in relation to it therefore exclusively identifies it as a product
licensed by Lotus or made by its successor in title, Caterham.
[27] There are many reasons why this new argument cannot be
upheld. Partly it flies in the face of the pleadings and although many of the
contrary allegations in the particulars of claim may have been unnecessary,
they funnelled attention in a different direction. It is not then permissible
to argue another case on appeal (Imprefed (Pty) Ltd v National Transport
Commission 1993 (3) SA 94 (A) 107G-I). Apart from this fatal objection,
the evidence simply does not support the argument.
[28] Assuming the name Seven to be capable of distinguishing,
even in the hands of Lotus it was not distinctive of the Series III. In fact,
when Lotus entered into the first agreement with Caterham during 1973,
Seven was the name used for the Series IV. In the result, the name Seven
had a diffuse meaning in 1972, referring to four differently shaped cars in
the Lotus series The potential purchaser of a new car asking for a Lotus
Seven would have received a Series IV. In the second-hand market the
request for a Lotus Seven simpliciter would have led to a query
[29) It being trite that a passing-off action does not protect a mark
or get-up in itself and that goodwill or reputation cannot exist by itself (cf
Star Industrial Company Limited v Yap Kwee Kor (trading a, New Star
Industrial Company) quoted in par [11] above), it is difficult to conceive of
an extant goodwill in the hands of Lotus in 1988, especially as Lotus had
last made and sold a III some 18 years before. Caterham, in attempting to
meet this problem, did not argue that the legal proposition just stated should
be reconsidered. The submission that Lotus had a goodwill in 1988 as the
result of Caterham's endeavours which enured to The benefit of Lotus
depends on whether Caterham had a licence from Lotus to build the III and
to use The Seven in relation thereto. The facts are clear. Caterham had no
such licence. The attempt to interpret The 1973 agreement differently to its
clear meaning was rejected by Howard IP, correctly so. In any event, the
agreement did not extend to this country. Before us Caterham jettisoned
this agreement. Instead, during the course of the oral argument reliance was
unexpectedly placed upon a tacit licence agreement. A patty who relies on
an express contract is not entitled to invoke a tacit contract on appeal (Roos
v Engineering Fabricators (Edms) Bpk 1974 (3) SA 543 (A) 556F). In
addition, this line was not foreshadowed during the trial and does not take
proper account of the evidence of Monk or Nearn given on behalf of
Caterham.
[30] I am prepared to accept That Caterham had a reputation during
The 1980's in South Africa. It was reputed to be The exclusive successor to
Lotus in relation to the Series III and properly licensed. The prime cause
of this was The belief That The 1973 agreement had given it Those rights.
Caterham, directly and indirectly, nurtured this notion. In addition, Howard
JP held that for many years Caterham had been sedulously passing off its
product as that of Lotus by the improper and unauthorised use of the trade
mark Lotus in relation to the Caterham Seven or Super Seven and that this
course of conduct was deliberate and dishonest. These factual findings
have not been shown to have been incorrect.
[31] Whether a passing-off action can be used to protect a
misapprehension or a false reputation appears to me to be open to serious
doubt but since it was not argued it need not be decided. However, to The
extent That a reputation is founded upon a conscious falsehood, public
policy demands That leg 4 protection should be withheld. Cf Scott and
Leisure Research and Design (Pty) Ltd 3? Watermaid (Ptv) Ltd 1985 (1) SA
I 1(C) 2200-22 lC. Caterham cannot be permitted to benefit from its own -
wrong.
[32] To sum up, I am of the view that Caterham has failed to
establish The reputation relied upon. As far as deception is concerned, there
can be little doubt that before 1988 Birkin did present itself to the South
African public as a Lotus licensee. This was done because Watson was
brought under the impression that it was true. This kind of representation
was effective, at least among a section of the motoring fraternity. However,
Caterham chose in its pleadings to limit itself to post 1988 representations
and, in any event, these acts are of no consequence to interdictory relief
which is concerned with future conduct and is not a remedy for past
wrongs.
[33] I have made occasional reference to Japan in The course of
this judgment. The reason is that Birkin exports cars to Japan, an important
market for Caterham. Part of the relief sought is an interdict preventing
Birkin from exporting these cars, especially to Japan. The allegations in the
pleadings that found This claim are similar to Those affecting The local
market and They amount to the following:
1. the use of The numeral 7 in conjunction with the car serves to identify it as emanating from Caterham or Lotus;
2. Caterham is The owner of the relevant goodwill in Japan;
3. The Birkin Seven is marketed in Japan by a distributor of Birkin's;
4. use of the numeral Seven on such a the car represents to the Japanese that the car's manufacture is authorised by Lotus;
5. The representation is false;
6. by exporting to Japan, Birkin is placing an instrument of deception in The hands of The distributor;
7. the misrepresentation constitutes an actionable wrong in Japan.
[34] Howard JP dismissed the claim. All his reasons are not
pertinent to The case as now argued. Postulating That The court below had
jurisdiction in regard to This claim because Birkin is an incola of that court,
one has to accept that Japanese laws governs the claim. But we do not
know what Japanese law in this regard is and we do not have the facility to
ascertain it readily and with sufficient certainty. What we do know is that
Caterham alleges that the misrepresentation relied upon by it constitutes
an actionable wrong in Japan. Foreign law being a question of fact, one would
have expected that the party wishing to invoke it, would prove it. Caterham
initially intended to do so because it filed an expert summary relating to the
law of unfair competition in Japan, from which it appears that there is a
recent statute governing the matter. The text of the statute was not
produced, nor was the witness. Is the court then obliged to presume that
the foreign law is the same as our law? Hoffimann & Zeffern The South
African Law of Evidence 4th ed p110-111 point out that our case law is not
consistent and refer to a well argued note by Prof Ellison Kahn (1970) 87
SALJ 145-149 who favours the approach that a failure to prove foreign
law will cause the plaintiff relying on it to lose his action or the defendant
relying on it to fall in his defence. whether the presumption can be applied
when the trial court has good reason to believe that the foreign law is not
he same as the local law, where the rule to be applied may be affected by
a difference in mores or where public policy considerations arise (as is the
case with passing-off), appears to me to be open to doubt (cf Cuba Railway
Company v Walter E Crosby [1912] 222 US 473, a decision of the Supreme
Court quoted with disapproval in Rogaly v General Imports (Pty) Limited
1948 (1) SA 1216 (C) 1230). In The absence of counsel's assistance it is
inadvisable to say more on the subject and I shall simply adopt the approach
of Corbett JA in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean
Commodities Inc and Others 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) 294H that the party
relying on a foreign statute should, generally speaking, place it before the
court. Having regard to the pleadings and the expert notice, Caterham was
saddled with that duty. It cannot hide behind its failure.
[35] If we have to apply South African law to this part of the case,
Caterham has to overcome the considerations discussed in The South
African context in pars [28] to [31], which apply in the light of the evidence
with equal force in the Japanese setting. No attempt to do so was made. An
even greater problem for Caterham is the fact that its evidence dealt
with misrepresentations made in advertisements which it tried to fix the
responsibility for on Birkin and Watson. It did not deal with The question
whether The Birkin Seven itself misled or could mislead anyone the
manner alleged. There is therefore no merit in this aspect of the appeal.
[36] I wish to say something about the practice note. It is required
of the practitioner who will argue the appeal to indicate which parts of the
record in his opinion are not relevant for the determination of the appeal
(1997 (3) SA 345; [1997] 2 All SA between pp 594 and 595). The object
of the note is essentially twofold. First, it enables the Chief Justice in
settling the roll to estimate how much reading matter is to be allocated to
a particular judge. Second, it assists judges in preparing the appeal without
wasting time and energy in reading irrelevant matter. Unless practitioners
comply with the spirit of this requirement the objects are frustrated and this
in turn leads to a longer waiting time for other matters. Caterham's note
boldly claimed that the whole record was relevant while it had to be obvious
that the whole record of 30 volumes and 2669 pages could not be,
especially in view of the limitation of the issues on appeal. when called
upon by the learned Judge presiding to reconsider, we were informed that
volumes were irrelevant. Even that was an understatement. Much more
was, as is apparent from Brian’s note which was filed out of time. This
conduct is unacceptable.
[37]There also appears to be a misconception about the function
and form of heads of argument. The rules of this Court require the filing
of main heads of argument the operative words are "main", "heads" and
"argument". "Main" refers to the most important part of the argument.
"Heads" means "points", not a dissertation. Lastly, "argument" involves a
process of reasoning which must be set out in the heads. A recital of The
facts and quotations from authorities do not amount to argument. By way
of a reminder I wish to quote from Van der Westhitizen NO v United
Democratic fund 1989 (2) SA 242 (A) 252 B-G:
"There is a growing tendency in this Court for counsel to incorporate
quotations from the evidence, from the Court a quo’s 's judgement and
from the authorities on which they rely, in their heads of argument.
I have no doubt that these quotations are intended for the
convenience of the Court but they seldom serve that purpose and
usually only add to the Court's burden. What is more important is
the effect which this practice has on the costs in civil cases.
Superfluous matter should therefore be omitted and, although all
quotations can obviously not be eliminated, they should be kept
within reasonable bounds. Counsel will be well advised to bear in
mind that Rule 8 of the Rules of this Court requires no more that the
main heads of argument. ... The heads abound with unnecessary
quotations from the record and from the authorities. They reveal,
moreover, another disturbing feature which is that the typing on
many pages does not cover the full page. ... Had the heads been
properly drawn and typed I do not think more than 20 pages would
have been requited. The costs cannot be permitted to be increased
in this manner and an order will therefore be made to ensure that the
respondent does not become liable for more than what was
reasonably necessary.
[38] Practitioners should note That a failure to give proper
attention to the requirements of the practice note and the heads might
result in the disallowance of part of their fees.
[39] In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs which include
those consequent upon the employment of two counsel.
________________
L T C HARMS
JUDGE OF APPEAL
SMALBERGER )
MARAIS ) Concur
SCHUTZ )
PLEWMAN )
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Danozeman
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 06:47 PM |
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Bloody hell thats a long post.
Dan
Built the purple peril!! Let the modifications begin!!
http://www.eastangliankitcars.co.uk
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Triton
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 07:17 PM |
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Somebody should spend more time in the garage........
My Daughter has taken over production of the damn fine Triton race seats and her contact email is emmatrs@live.co.uk.
www.tritonraceseats.com
www.hairyhedgehog.com
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mangogrooveworkshop
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 07:46 PM |
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quote:
Originally posted by Triton
Somebody should spend more time in the garage........
I am in the garage...... I have read it several times and it amazes me what was said about the catervan lotus relationship........
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marktigere1
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 09:25 PM |
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Thanks Chaps
I can sleep easier now
Cheers
Mark
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Kissy
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 09:58 PM |
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I don't think you should be allowed to sleep until you've conjured up a longer post - that has to be a forum record.
Methinks I should not have said that last bit.
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marktigere1
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| posted on 2/12/05 at 10:16 PM |
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mind you, great cure for insomnia
Mark
[Edited on 2/12/05 by marktigere1]
If a bolt is stuck force it.
If it breaks, it needed replacing anyway!!!
(My Dad 1991)
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Ian Pearson
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| posted on 3/12/05 at 12:39 AM |
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Yaaaaawn.
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mangogrooveworkshop
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| posted on 3/12/05 at 02:55 AM |
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quote:
Originally posted by Kissy
I don't think you should be allowed to sleep until you've conjured up a longer post - that has to be a forum record.
Methinks I should not have said that last bit.
3 am an all is well
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britishtrident
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| posted on 3/12/05 at 01:06 PM |
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Its all very complex the problem first reared its ugly head when westfield started selling a lot of kits, the early Westfield brochure had sold the
car as a Lotus Seven S1 replica just asking for trouble.
The interesting thing is that although on the face of it Caterham have come out on top they actually done themselves immense damage in the process,
no matter how much money I had in the bank I would never now buy a Caterham.
Caterham were not the only company Colin Champman sold Lotus Seven rights to, as with most deals Colin Chapman and his side kick Fred Bushell were
involved in they maxminised the profit, It is certain that at least one company in New Zealand held rights to produce the Seven S4 and even managed to
produce a few cars.
Seven is of course a generic car model name (ie Austin Seven) and I am pretty sure Caterhams hold on it isn't bullet proof.
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